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employee tax deductible contributions.
Those contributions are permitted for
401(k) and DB plans for state and local
government employees. Extending tax
deductibility to private sector DB plan
participants would help level the playing
field between DB and 401(k) plans.
The increase in life expectancy
appears to have contributed to the decline
in DB plans, because DB plans are not
flexibile enough to deal readily with
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T

he primary goals of the U.S.
pension system are to provide secure
and adequate retirement income and to
cover all or most workers. In each of
these respects, the system needs better
solutions. With the decline in defined
benefit (DB) plans and the increasing
reliance on 401(k) plans, future retirees
will have less secure and less adequate
retirement income than current retirees.
These issues are addressed in the book
Pension Policy: The Search for Better
Solutions, which was recently published
by the Upjohn Institute (see p. 7). This
article summarizes the main policy
recommendations from the book.
Policy Recommendations for
401(k) Plans
Since the 1980s, the role of 401(k)
plans has changed from being mainly
supplementary, offered by employers who
also offer a DB plan, to often being the
only plan employers provide. However,
401(k) plan regulation has lagged in
recognizing its increasingly important
role.
The regulation of 401(k) plans should
be changed so that two types of plans
would be recognized. First, 401(k)
retirement plans would be the primary or
sole plan provided by an employer and
would be regulated as retirement plans
rather than savings plans. The goal here
is to close the regulatory gap between
DB plans and 401(k) plans. For example,
the 401(k) retirement plan would be
required to offer an annuity as the default
payout option, with spousal consent
for not taking a joint and survivor’s
annuity, similar to the spousal protections
provided by DB plans.
The second type, a 401(k) savings
plan, would be offered by employers that
also offer DB plans meeting minimum
standards as to generosity. These plans
would continue to be regulated as they
currently are, reflecting their historical

roots as secondary plans that supplement
DB plans. Having this two-tier regulation
of 401(k) plans could encourage
employers to offer DB plans because it
would permit them to offer 401(k) plans
meeting less rigorous standards.
Participants in 401(k) plans often
unknowingly bear the plan’s investment
costs and typically also the administrative
costs. The fees they pay (in dollars), as
well as the expense ratio for investment
expenses, should be disclosed on annual
and quarterly account statements. This
type of disclosure is done in Australia
for administrative fees and by the Janus
mutual funds for investment costs.
While the focus of much pension
research is on inertia by pension
participants, a seldom discussed
problem with the coverage provided by

With the decline in defined
benefit plans, future retirees
will have less secure retirement
income than current retirees.
defined contribution plans is the lack of
persistency of contributions by many
workers. The lack of persistency explains
in part the surprisingly low account
balances that many 401(k) participants
have. Policy has not been developed to
address this problem.
Policy Recommendations for Defined
Benefit Plans
Some analysts consider the decline
in DB plans as an inevitable outcome
because those plans are unable to
adapt to a changing economic and
demographic environment. A number of
policies could be considered, however,
based on the view that their endangered
status is due in part to their regulatory
environment.
Private sector DB plans are the
only major type of pension plan in
the United States that does not permit

The role of 401(k) plans has
changed from being mainly
supplementary to often being
the only plan employers provide.
this continued rise in cost. In the United
States, some plans have reduced their
generosity, but generally this change is
only done for new hires and thus has
limited effect on the plan sponsor’s costs.
Life expectancy risk can be divided
into the idiosyncratic risk that a particular
individual will live longer than expected
and the cohort risk that an entire cohort
on average will live longer than expected.
Annuity providers are able to manage
idiosyncratic risk by pooling it across
large numbers of people, effectively
diversifying it away. However, cohort
risk cannot be pooled because it is
correlated across participants. Life
expectancy indexing of benefits is one
way of dealing with this risk. With
that approach, cohort risk is borne by
workers, who are the beneficiaries of the
improved life expectancy and thus are
best able to bear the risk.
A policy innovation, following the
Notional Defined Contribution plan
in Sweden, would be to permit life
expectancy indexing of benefits at
retirement. For each new retirement
cohort, the generosity of the plan would
be adjusted downward to reflect the trend
toward greater life expectancy. Under
current U.S. law, this innovation would
be prohibited because it would violate
the anticutback rule, which is defined
in terms of annual benefits. If that rule
were redefined to take an economist’s
perspective and use lifetime benefits as
the measure, life expectancy indexing
would not constitute a cutback in lifetime
benefits.
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The tax system could be used to
encourage broader coverage through DB
plans. For example, to tie the interests
of management to those of workers, the
allowable maximum income considered
for determining DB plan benefits could
be raised in plans that provide coverage
to all full-time workers. Another option
could require employers that provide a
DB plan for management to also provide
a similar plan for employees.
Workers in DB plans who are laid
off suffer losses on the benefits they
have already accrued. Their benefits
are frozen in nominal terms at layoff,
and the real value of those benefits is
eroded by inflation between that point
and the point at which they qualify for
retirement benefits. DB plans can make
these workers wait until age 65 to receive
benefits. For laid-off workers, the loss of
pension benefits can be more serious than

The fees that participants
pay (in dollars), as well as the
expense ratio for investment
expenses, should be disclosed
on annual and quarterly
account statements.
the loss of wages, while for employers
the loss of pension benefits gives them a
bonus for laying off workers.
One policy option is to require
firms that lay off workers in corporate
restructuring to price index the benefits
of those workers until retirement. This
obligation in a certain sense would not
impose a new cost on employers, it just
would mandate that they pay the benefits
to these workers that they had promised
to pay assuming continued employment.
Funding rules prohibit employers
from contributing to DB plans in years
that funding exceeds a certain level.
This requirement of zero contributions
generally occurs when the stock market
and companies are performing well.
Because pension plans are long-term
commitments, and because of the
fluctuations in the stock market, at a later
date plan sponsors then generally are
required to contribute. This requirement
generally occurs when the stock market
and companies are performing poorly.
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The temporal pattern of contributions
not only increases the volatility of
contributions, it forces plan sponsors to
contribute on a schedule that is exactly
opposite to what they would choose.
To reduce the volatility and timing
problem of employer contributions
for DB plan funding, the maximum
contribution requirements can be eased.
For example, plans could be allowed
to contribute 25 percent of the normal
cost any year, regardless of the level of
funding, thus allowing plan sponsors
to contribute every year. This is the
desired pattern for pension plans, which
are ongoing entities that are accruing
liabilities every year.
Losing track of pensions is a problem
for workers who are laid off or who
change jobs. It can be difficult for a
worker to find a pension from a former
employer, particularly if that employer
has gone out of business. Both the United
Kingdom and Australia have gone further
than the United States in assisting people

facing this problem. A national registry,
perhaps as an expansion of the registry
maintained by the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation, would be an
improvement in this area.
Conclusions
Pension policy is an evolving
product of social institutions and the
economy. With the decline in DB plans
and the increasing role of 401(k) plans,
improvement is needed in the way
pensions are provided to U.S. workers.
The regulation of 401(k) plans needs
to be updated to recognize that they
generally are no longer supplementary
plans. Policies need to be enacted to
strengthen DB plans by making them
more flexible and improving the ways
they are funded.
John A. Turner is the director of the
Pension Policy Center.
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